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1. Introduction 
The blossom of Cultural Economics over the past four decades has been accompanied 
by a vivid interest in the Economics of Museums as a major subfield of research. 
Montias (1973) was one of the pioneers in this area, with very influential contributions 
to several issues, some of which remain open to dispute even today. To begin with, he 
raised the issue of whether or not museums’ management was concerned with the public 
interest, rather than with the interests of a subgroup of field specialists, using the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, in New York, as an example. As it turns out, this moral 
hazard issue is one of the key concerns of this paper, albeit in an econometric 
perspective, rather than on a case study one. 
 On the other hand, Montias (1973) also revealed a keen concern with the strategic issue 
of collections management, suggesting an auction mechanism associated with museum 
patronage, to allow smaller museums to receive collection items that otherwise would 
just be stored in the basements of the major museums for a long time. Underlying this 
reasoning is the perception that lending works of art obtained through patronage is not 
always legally easy. 
A second transversal issue that has been around since the early seventies is the question 
of whether or not entries should be paid. Peacock and Godfrey (1974), Netzer (1978), 
Throsby and Whithers (1979), Frey and Pommerehne (1989) are among the first 
contributors to this field. Although we shall not address the normative issue of whether 
culture should or should not be a recipient of public grants, there are some close 
connections between this problem and that of moral hazard in museum management: 
Frey and Pommerehne (1989), for instance, make a strong case against such policies 
claiming they would reduce incentives for management to seek efficient practices. 
Rodriguez and Blanco (2006) have recently developed a most interesting contract 
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theory model where the source of income of the museum (namely subsidies versus own 
revenues) is associated with moral hazard problems, and the design of a proper 
incentives mechanism is suggested. 
Finally, a number of studies have assessed the positive externalities associated with the 
consumption of cultural goods, and museum visits in particular. These externalities are 
both static and inter-temporal and have been used by some to argue in favour of the 
existence of a market failure, thus providing an incentive for public subsidies to be 
granted to museums (for a discussion, see, inter alia, Peacock (1969), Throsby (1994) 
and Bailey and Falconer (1998)).  
In spite of this rapid growth in the Economics of Museums, there has been a markedly  
less significant research on the side of empirical and econometric studies therein, 
namely from the point of view of their financing and budgeting strategies. Most 
empirical studies concerning the Economics of Museums have focused on attempts to 
estimate demand, production and cost functions. In particular, with respect to the 
Portuguese case, the only econometric study in the field of the Economics of Museums 
pertains to an attempt to estimate a visitors’ demand function (Matos, 1996).  
With respect to museums’ funding, Hughes and Luksetich (1999) and Maddison (2004) 
remain the fundamental and almost only empirical references. Hughes and Luksetich 
(1999) have looked at a cross section of US museums and tried to identify the 
interactions between different types of funding. In particular, they were interested in 
assessing whether or not government subsidies would crowd out private donations. 
Instead they found evidence of a stong positive influence of government funding on 
private contributions. Taking a different approach, Maddison (2004) has looked at a 
panel of UK museums. Whilst he did not have the necessary data to test the crowding 
out hypothesis, his research allowed him to assess whether or not there was evidence of 
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Granger causality of some types of revenues and costs on government grants. Maddison 
(2004) has also attempted to look at the issue of the type of budgeting strategy pursued 
by museums: incremental budgeting, performance-based budgeting or activity-based 
budgeting. 
In this paper, we follow a similar approach to the one in Maddison (2004) in that we 
explore a new panel on sources of funding for Portuguese museums. This is to our 
knowledge the first attempt to conduct such a study for Portugal, and the first work ever 
to be conducted on this data set. Like Maddison (2004), we use a dynamic panel model 
specification, but our econometric approach differs markedly: firstly, we test for panel 
unit roots, a problem that Maddison (2004) does not address; secondly, we allow for the 
possibility that there might be heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the data (again a 
discussion that is absent in Maddison (2004) and that is shown to be crucial in, e.g., 
Arellano and Bond (1991)). Finally, we conduct a more rigorous assessment of model 
specification by also looking at global significance by means of a Wald test (again 
following more closely the seminal paper by Arellano and Bond (1991)). Our 
conclusions shall differ markedly from those obtained for UK museums, implying 
different policy recommendations. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some evidence pertaining 
to the economic relevance of the cultural sector in general, and of museums in 
particular, in the Portuguese economy. Section 3 discusses the data used. Section 4 
discusses the econometric methodology and the estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The economic relevance of Museums in Portugal 
The economic relevance of cultural activities in EU countries varies widely, but remains 
a relatively undisputed fact. In Portugal, the weight of family cultural expenditures on 
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GDP was of about 4% during the nineties (Neves, 2004), whilst the share of public 
expenditure in culture to total public expenditure varied between 0.75% and 1%, over 
the same period. In 2003, 632.687.000 Euro were spent with cultural activities by the 
Portuguese government.  
As far as museums are concerned, employment in museums or in museum related 
activities represented 0.8% of total business employment, and 37% of total cultural 
employment, in Portugal, in 2003. Not accounting for tourism, the cultural sector is 
responsible for 1.5% of employment in Portugal, a value that is not too dissimilar to the 
ones observed, for example, in Spain, France, Belgium and Poland: 2.1%, 2%, 2.2% and 
1.7%, respectively (Eurostat, 2006). 
The vast majority of Portuguese museums (in fact, more than 60%) are publicly owned 
and publicly managed (either by a local authority, a regional government, or the central 
government). Evidence shows that high budget public museums (those with more than 
498.800€ of annual expenditures) are usually managed by the central government, 
whilst low budget museums (less than 49.880€ of annual expenditures) are usually 
managed by local authorities, namely city councils. Clearly, most Portuguese museums 
exhibit annual expenditures of less than 249.399€ (about 65.8% of all Portuguese 
museums). Only 1.8% have annual expenditures in excess of 498.800€ (Neves, 2004). 
When assessing Portuguese museums, a common budgeting problem seems to emerge 
from the surveys: 63.1% of all museums indicate that they do not elaborate their own 
budget (OAC, 2005). Rather, responsibility for allocating funds to different museums 
rests with the proper governing authority (local, regional or central), in the case of 
publicly owned museums. This raises the issue of whether incremental budgeting 
strategies are being pursued. With an incremental budgeting strategy, the needs of each 
museum are simply assessed on the basis of the amount of money the museum has spent 
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in the past. Therefore, increases in expenditures are likely to increase future grants. This 
option clearly raises efficiency issues: on the one hand, museums are likely not to 
engage in more efficient cost reducing management practices, since it is perceived that 
these will ultimately reduce the funds available in years to come; on the other, it is not 
uncommon, with incremental budgeting, that managers seek to spend the full amount 
they are allocated each year, as savings might translate into lower allocation of funds in 
the coming future. 
 There is a wide consensus in the public finance literature that incremental budgeting 
practices might lead to lock-ins in the time paths of grant allocations: once these are 
awarded to inefficient and wasteful museums, they are likely to be awarded to them for 
a number of years. Adding to this, there is scope for a moral hazard issue, whereby 
museums’ management might pursue interests that are not those of the general public 
and, clearly, not those of the authority ruling over them (whether local, regional or 
central). There are no incentives for management to behave differently. 
The alternative to incremental budgeting would be the pursuit of either activity-based 
budgeting or performance-based budgeting. The first would emphasize capital 
expenditures and new acquisitions of collections, rather than operating costs. The 
second would make funds allocation an explicit function of some measure of 
performance the museums should target (eg. a high number of visitors, showing a 
compromise between management and the general public interests). From a normative 
point of view, a case could be made in favour of performance-based budgeting, since 
public grants are ultimately supported by taxes levied on the general public. 
A final remark worth noticing is the irrelevance of museum patronage in Portugal. 
Indeed, in spite of a series of legislative changes favouring private donors, cultural 
patronage is mainly focused on other cultural activities (namely music festivals). 
 
The first author acknowledges financial support from Maiêutica, through the 
Research Uni UNICES. Financial Support from the Fundação para a Ciência e 
Tecnologia, Lisboa, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author.  
7 
Between 1986 and 1996, the weight of museum patronage in Portuguese cultural 
patronage, is only 2.6% (Santos et al, 1998). 
Combining the low levels of funding involved in museum patronage and the 
overwhelming majority of publicly owned museums, it seems to be the case that a 
discussion of possible crowding out of private grants by public subsidies makes little 
sense for Portugal. In fact, the discussion on whether or not the budgeting of public 
museums is correctly designed to provide incentives to pay attention to the public 
interest, and to avoid inefficient management, seems much more relevant (in contrast 
with the problem addressed by Hughes and Luksetich, 1999). 
3. Data 
We have used I.N.E.
1
 data for this study. The sample consists of yearly data, comprising 
the period from 1983 to 1998. The choice not to use more recent data had to do with the 
change in criteria and methodologies that I.N.E. has used to collect museums data in 
subsequent periods, making a coherent analysis difficult if not impossible.  
The sample contains information with respect to costs, revenues and number of visitors 
for 10 Portuguese Museums
2
 in the sample period. In particular, we have used the 
following variables (we provide the abbreviations we shall use for each variable in the 
econometric model, and a description of what it stands for; where relevant, further 
information about the variable is provided): 
- dsd (donations and subsidies) concerns the amount of funding each museum has 
received each year under the form of public or private grants and subsidies (a 
                                                 
1
 The Portuguese Office for National Statistics. 
2
 All of these are Public Museums, managed by local authorities. They are similar in size, suggesting no 
heterogeneity issues, although such possibility shall be into due account in the subsequent econometric 
analysis.  
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discrimination between public and private sources of funding is not possible 
with I.N.E. data alone
3
); 
- rp (receipts) is the amount of revenues each museum has generated by itself, in 
any given year (Although all museums in our sample are public, they do charge 
an admission fee. Nonetheless, this is largely symbolic, and aiming at avoiding 
the overcrowding of museums, rather than to cover costs. The main revenues 
considered here, apart from the admission fees, are related to restaurant and bar 
services, as well as to souvenir shops. All museums considered in the sample 
offer restaurant and bar services, and all of them have souvenir shops). 
- rem (staff remuneration) concerns the total amount of salaries each museum has 
paid, per year; 
- coc (cost of new collections) is, for each museum, the cost it has endured, in any 
given year, with respect to the purchase of new collections; 
- iequip (investment in new equipments) refers to investments made by a 
museum, in any sample year, (excluding the purchase of new collections); 
- epr (extraordinary revenues) is the amount of revenue a museum has generated 
in a given year by conducting studies and research it has been ordered by the 
government or by other museums, and by engaging in repair work; 
- od stands for other expenditures (a residual class, once one has taken account of 
the cost of new collections, other investments and labour costs); 
- nvisits: is the number of visitors a museum has had in any year4. 
All cost and revenue variables are expressed in Portuguese escudos and are evaluated at 
constant prices (with 1998 being the reference year). It should also be pointed out that 
                                                 
3
 As discussed previously, this should be irrelevant in the Portuguese case. 
4
 Given the description provided for the rp variable, it is clear there is a very low correlation between that 
variable and the number of visitors. Hence, multicollinearity concerns are excluded from our econometric 
analysis. 
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all the museums in the sample were, during the period surveyed, publicly owned. In 
particular, the sample comprises museums from a variety of fields: art, science and 
technology, natural history, archaeology, anthropology and history, among others.  
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table (1) reports some descriptive statistics pertaining to the variables we have chosen 
to include in the econometric model.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the model variables 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
Dsd 326595.7 523643.5 
Rp 235751.4 396219.8 
rem  368190.6 475934.2 
Coc 13713.08 20187.39 
Iequip 64431.27 101319.9 
Epr 26180.88 49615.61 
Od 137702.2 247080 
Nvisits 648942.3 655821.6 
 
Three fundamental conclusions seem to arise from table (1). Firstly, considering all the 
cost variables (rem, coc, iequip and od), labour costs clearly represent, on average, the 
heaviest burden over musems’ finances. In fact, on average, wages represent a fraction 
of about 63% of total costs. Other expenditures (od) stand for 23.6%, whilst equipment 
investment is only 11% of the total cost. The purchase of new collections is the least 
significant share of museums’ costs. In other words, for the average Portuguese 
museum in an average year, labour costs are nearly 2/3 of all the costs it has to endure. 
Since labour costs and other expenditures are, by definition, operating costs, it is easy to 
see that the bulk of the average museum income is diverted from such activities as 
improving the quality of exhibitions or augmenting the space for visitors (see Foster and 
Maddison, 2003, for a discussion on the costs of congestion).  
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Secondly, table (1) also reveals that the income generated by the average museum in an 
average year is only 40.4% of the museum’s total costs. Clearly this is insufficient even 
to face operating expenditures (in fact it is even insufficient to meet the average yearly 
wage bill). Portuguese museums in the sample, and during the sample period, clearly 
rely on external funding to meet nearly 60% of all costs. In short, table (1) strongly 
suggests there is a wide scope for improvement in the management practices of 
Portuguese museums, which are most likely to be inefficient (see Mairesse and Vanden 
Eeckaut (2004) for a discussion on museum efficiency).  
Finally, table (1) also suggests there is a wide variability in all of the sample variables, 
with particular emphasis on dsd. This might indicate one should proceed with caution in 
the econometric model analysis, in particular with respect to the possibility of 
heteroscedasticity in the estimation residuals. On the other hand, such in sample 
variability points also to the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity amongst museums, 
suggesting econometric procedures that are capable of coping with such a problem. It is 
well known in the econometrics literature that not accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent estimation. 
4.2  Econometric Results 
The baseline model we have used is given by: 
 
 
, 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1
7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i i t
dsd dsd rem rp coc epr
iequip od nvisits v
     
   
    
  
     
    
 (0.1) 
  
It is convenient to partition the right-hand side variables in two blocks:  *, 1 , 1:i t i tdsd  x . 
*
, 1i tx  is therefore a vector of  1k   regressors, which are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous: 
*
, ,cov( ; ) 0,
i
i t s t sx v   (footnote 8, ahead, will provide a justification for this 
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assumption). A similar assumption, with respect to a very similar set of variables, is 
made in Maddison (2004). Notwithstanding, Maddison (2004) provides no support nor 
discussion for the strict exogeneity of regressors he assumes.   
Unobserved individual heterogeneity, iv , is assumed to be time-invariant. Possible 
stochastic trends in any of the regressors or in the dependent variable are tested for 
rather than assumed (for an overview on panel unit root tests, see Banerjee (1999)).  The 
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) panel unit root test was conducted for each variable. This 
test is preferable to the one suggested by Hadri (2000) given the small panel 
dimensions. The Levin, Lu and Chu (2002) test assumes that all museums share the 
same autoregressive coefficient, but it does allow for museum specific effects, time 
effects and time trends. It also allows for autocorrelation in the residuals. 
The null hypothesis refers to nonstationarity. In particular, the null postulates that the 













                                                 
5
 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) provide Monte Carlo evidence strongly suggesting that a very good 
approximation to the asymptotic distribution of their test statistc is already obtained with T=25 and N=10. 
Albeit our time dimension being shorter than theirs, the very low p-values of table (2) - in all cases but 
one rounded to zero at the fourth decimal - imply that the observed test statistics in our sample are such 
that for a 5% significance level, this is very unlikely to cause any major inference issues, under rejecting 
the hypothesis of a unit root.  
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Several competing specifications of the auxiliary regression (with deterministic trend 
and constant, and with no constant nor trend) were also tried, but the results do not seem 
to be sensitive to the specification chosen. In particular, table (2) suggests that, at a 5% 
significance level, the null hypothesis is always rejected, leading us to conclude that all 
variables in the panel are stationary.  
The rejection of the null hypothesis in the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test has led us to a 
different model specification than that used in Maddison (2004). Indeed, whilst the 
author felt the need to include a time-varying intercept to accommodate possible 
nonstationarities, we choose to perform a proper panel unit root test. Therefore, the 
aforementioned rejection of the null for every variable, has led us to choose a time-
invariant intercept.   
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The suggested model in equation (0.1) was estimated using the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) GMM approach
6
. We are well aware that the semi-asymptotic results developed 
by the authors were obtained assuming that N   whilst T  is fixed. Their approach is 
therefore said to be designed for large N and small T panels (Bond, 2002). Much of the 
subsequent literature on dynamic panel data has followed the same path (see, inter alia, 
Ahn and Schmidt (1995), and Arellano and Honore (2001)). However, as in Maddison 
(2004), we were faced with the difficulty of estimating a dynamic model from a panel of 
observations where the cross-sectional dimension is itself small. This problem has led to 
a number of Monte Carlo studies in the literature. Kiviet (1995, 2001) and Harris and 
Mátyás (1996) have argued that the performance of GMM estimators in this setting 
varies with the dimensions of the panel and the true parameter values.  
Notwithstanding, Judson and Owen (1999) have shown that the GMM estimator is the 
best option for values of N and T that are close to the ones in our sample. The Least 
Squares Dummy Variable estimator (LSDV) seems better than the GMM estimator for 
larger time dimensions, namely T 30 . Notwithstanding, GMM seems to be preferable, 
even in comparison with the Anderson-Hsiao (1981) estimator, for the small time 
dimension considered. All these procedures seem to be dominated by the corrected 
LSDV estimator (LSDVC). This alternative is not considered in Maddison (2004). 
Notwithstanding, many computational aspects remain unclear with respect to the 
LSDVC estimator (namely with respect to unbalanced panels, among other issues). 
In short, we choose the same estimation procedure as Maddison (2004) in his 
assessment of the financing of British museums, by proceeding with the GMM 
                                                 
6
 All estimation results reported in this paper were obtained using STATA 9.2. The instruments used were 
the lagged values of the dependent variable, and current and lagged values of all strictly exogenous 
regressors. 
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estimator. The results from Judson and Owen (1999) provide reliable reassurance for 
this option. 
It should be noticed that the specification of equation (0.1) is different from that in 
Hughes and Luksetich (1999), as their data set was cross sectional. Therefore, although 
we cannot perform the same type of crowding out analysis as they did, due to 
insufficient information, we are in a better position to assess budgeting strategies and 
Granger causality.  
  
After first differencing, it is clear that the unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity 




 *, 2 , 1 , 1 ,i t i t i t i tdsd dsd       β x  (0.2) 
 
First order autocorrelation may exist in the residuals of equation (0.2). However, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) point out that the researcher’s concern should be with second 
order autocorrelation. We improve on Maddison (2004), in the sense that we explicitly 
take into account the possibility of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the 
estimation residuals. In particular, robust standard errors are used (as advised in 
Arellano and Bond, 1991, when there is the risk of heteroscedasticity), and residual 
autocorrelation is explicitly tested for. 
 We also use a Wald test to assess global significance of the suggested model, whilst 
this was not a concern in Maddison’s (2004) analysis. Finally, we take into account the 
                                                 
7
 Time invariant parameters, such as the intercept, may be recovered since we have a sufficient number of 
instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
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possibility of over identifying restrictions, through a Sargan test, something that this is 
absent from the discussion in Maddison (2004)
8
. 
Table (3) reports the estimation results. The robust standard errors option was used. 
Table 3: Estimation results and individual significance observed test statistics with matching p-values.  





dsd  0,362994 0,0399594 9,08 0,000 
rp  -0,0494201 0,1658742 0,3 0,766 
rem  0,454962 0,0923602 4,93 0,000 
coc  0,1530771 1,742032 0,09 0,93 
epr  0,5686054 0,348094 1,63 0,102 
iequip  0,6294475 0,2790177 2,26 0,024 
od  0,327079 0,1731178 1,89 0,059 
nvisits  -0,0351583 0,0515095 -0,68 0,495 
Constant 17103,56 5363,446 3,19 0,001 
 
The estimated model reported in table (3) is globally significant, as can be inferred from 
the observed Wald test statistic of 180265.58 (clearly bigger than the critical value 
obtained from the 
2
(8)  distribution). Furthermore, using Arellano and Bond’s 2m  
statistic for second order autocorrelation, we conclude that the associated p-value is 
0.1644. This is higher than the significance level used (5%), so we do not reject the null 
                                                 
8
 Results for the Sargan test, however, shall not be reported in the main text, as they refer to versions of 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure that rest upon the use of conventional standard errors, instead of 
the robust ones used in the estimation results presented. Notwithstanding, if one was to proceed with 
estimation, without taking into account the possibility of heteroscedasticy, and to use conventional 
standard errors, evidence shows that the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions fails to reject the null 
(p-value is 0.1448). A fundamental implication of this is that the assumption of strict exogeneity with 
respect to the variables in 
*
, 1i tx is validated. Differently, Maddison (2004) did not report any evidence in 
support of his strict exogeneity assumption.  
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of no second order autocorrelation
9
. Results for Sargan’s test of over-identifying 
restrictions are not discussed in the main text since the selected model in equation (0.2) 
was estimated with robust standard errors: the asymptotic distribution of this test 
statistic is unknown with the robust model.   
Inference on individual coefficients proves to be most interesting, mainly in 
confrontation with the results of Maddison (2004). Clearly, the most noticeable 
difference is the absence of individual significance of the rp variable, in the Portuguese 
case. That is, the museums’ own revenues do not play a role when private and public 
agents make decisions on the grants to be awarded. It is true that the estimated 
coefficient has a negative sign, indicating that both public and private donors might 
perceive the ability of the museums to generate revenues as a surrogate for their own 
grants. Notwithstanding, the variable is clearly insignificant, leading to the fundamental 
conclusion that the budgeting of public Portuguese museums, as far as donors are 
concerned, does not rest on their own ability to generate revenues. This is a strong 
suggestion that incremental budgeting routines play a role in the decision making 
process. The budgeting practices provide no incentives for museum management to 
focus on obtaining other sources of income.  
The fact that the number of visitors is insignificant, from a statistical viewpoint, rules 
out performance-based budgeting. In this respect our conclusion is similar to that of 
Maddison (2004) concerning British Museums. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind 
that visitor numbers are often an inaccurate measure. Creigh-Tyte and Selwood (1998) 
discuss this issue in depth. Edwards (1996) finds that there is an overstatement of visitor 
numbers in the British Museum of about 35-40% per year. On the positive side, visitor 
                                                 
9
 It could be pointed out that we also conclude in favour of the absence of first order positive 
autocorrelation, on the basis of Arellano and Bond’s 1m  statistic.  
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numbers are the only output indicator, as far the museum activity goes, available for the 
Portuguese case.  
Furthermore, the fact that the lagged value of grants is statistically significant and that 
the estimated coefficient is positive (even at the 1% significance level) points in the 
direction of a certain degree of persistence in the award of grants and subsidies. This 
again indicates that routines play a role in budgeting practices. 
One should also notice that labour costs are statistically significant as is equipment 
investment. We disagree with Maddison (2004) in the interpretation that lagged 
equipment investment is a tantamount to activity-based budgeting. It can also be 
interpreted as an influence of past budgets on the current year budget. When considered 
jointly, the relevance of the lagged labour costs, lagged grants, and even lagged other 
expenditures (if one is to notice that its p-value only marginally exceeds the 5% 
significance level) does seem to reinforce the notion that publicly owned Portuguese 
museums operate on the basis of incremental budgeting.  
On the other hand, if one was to worry with causality, in the sense of statistical 
precedence, as defined by Granger (1969), the most striking conclusion of our analysis 
is that whilst past expenditures seem to have an influence on the current budget, the 
museums ability to generate revenues is irrelevant for that purpose. There is a large 
scope for inefficiencies in the use of public resources in this scenario. The government 
is depriving itself of a fundamental tool to induce less wasteful management by public 
museums.  
5. Conclusion 
By conducting the first econometric assessment of the interaction between sources of 
museum funding in Portugal, this paper has some new findings that should be of interest 
both to academics and policy-makers. The most striking of these is the clear evidence in 
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favour of incremental budgeting practices in Portuguese museums. In a contrast with the 
findings of Maddison (2004) for UK museums, it is clear that the ability to generate its 
own revenues does not influence the grants a Portuguese museum is to receive in the 
future. This provides a wide scope for inefficiencies, where management is likely to 
pursue its own agenda, as there is no perceived penalty for not taking the public interest 
into account. Moreover, the statistical significance of lagged grants suggests the 
possibility of inefficient lock-ins, whereby past grants to inefficient museums are 
perpetuated through time. 
In short, the empirical results in section 4 are coherent with the available evidence for 
museums in Portugal discussed in section 2. Most museums do not make their own 
budgets: rather these are the received from the relevant authority as a result of reported 
past expenditures. That being the case, there is clearly scope for a moral hazard 
problem, as more current expenditures are perceived as generating higher grants in the 
future. 
Finally, the discussion of possible crowding out effects makes little sense when museum 
patronage is relatively insignificant in Portugal (evidence in section 2 shows that 
cultural patronage mainly seeks other activities).  
A fundamental policy implication seems to arise from this paper. The budgeting process 
of Portuguese museums should be revised. Firstly, incremental budgeting should be 
replaced by zero based budgets or by activity-based budgets. Incremental budgets 
institutionalize a wrong system of incentives where it appears to exist a payoff to 
wasteful museum managers. The design of a proper incentives mechanism might be 
helped by a reduction on the share of publicly owned museum’s in Portugal, or by the 
adoption of hybrid management solutions (see Schuster (1998) for a discussion on 
hybridization of museum management). In any event, it is clear that museums should be 
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responsible for producing and providing a justification for their own budgets, rather 
than relying on a formula whereby the current year’s grants are equal to last year’s 
expenditure plus some incremental factor.  
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